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JUVENILE CURFEWS IN ILLINOIS:
A STEP BACKWARD
Juvenile curfew laws have been in force throughout the United
States since the late 1800's.1 Most courts have considered the imposi-
tion of such curfews to be a reasonable exercise of the police power of
the state.2 Recently, a significant minority of courts has condemned
such laws as violations of due process. 3 This trend was arrested,
however, by the recent case of People v. Chambers,4 in which the
Illinois Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision 5 which had
found the Illinois state-wide juvenile curfew unconstitutional. In so
doing, the Chambers court missed an opportunity to reform an area of
the law already fraught with archaic legal fictions.6
1. People v. Chambers, 32 111. App. 3d 444, 450, 335 N.E.2d 612, 615 (1975). At the
turn of the century approximately 3000 municipalities had enacted juvenile curfew
ordinances. Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate, 236 Md. 548, 552, 204 A.2d 688, 690-91
(1964). Until World War II there was no great increase in the use of such laws, but
wartime conditions (e.g., parents in the armed services or at work late at night in war
plants; greater number of servicemen in urban areas) provided the impetus for a new
spate of legislation.Id.
Interest in such laws has not been limited to small communities. As of 1966 (the most
recent date for which comprehensive statistics are available), 48 cities with populations
over 100,000 had juvenile curfews in force. City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 7 Ohio App. 2d
212, 214, 220 N.E.2d 126, 128 (1966). Besides Illinois (see notes 7, 8 infra) there are
presently three states with some form of statewide juvenile curfew law. MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.342(2) (Supp. 1976) provides that no person under 16 "shall. . .loiter, idle or
congregate in or on any public street, highway, alley or park between the hours of 12
midnight and 6 A.M." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.131 (Supp. 1976) prohibits persons under
17 "from driving a motor vehicle upon any public highway between the hours of 12
midnight and 5 A.M." ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.710 (1975) prohibits the presence of minors
in public "between the hours of 12 midnight and 4 A.M. the following morning" with
certain exceptions. The New Hampshire State Legislature has promulgated a "model"
juvenile curfew ordinance, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:43-c (Supp. 1975), which the
cities of that state may adopt. For a general discussion of curfew laws, see Note, Curfew
Ordinances and the Control of Nocturnal Juvenile Crime, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 66 (1958);
Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 321 (1974).
2. See, e.g., Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa.
1975); In re C., 28 Cal. App. 3d 747, 105 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1972); People v. Walton, 70 Cal.
App. 2d 862, 161 P.2d 498 (1945); Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate, 236 Md. 548, 204 A.2d
688 (1964); City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 7 Ohio App. 2d 212, 220 N.E.2d 126 (1966).
3. See Alves v. Justice Court, 148 Cal. App. 2d 419, 306 P.2d 601 (1957); In re Doe, 54
Haw. 647, 513 P.2d 1385 (1973); Ex Parle McCarver, 39 Tex. Crim. 448, 46 S.W. 936
(Crim. App. 1898); City of Seattle v. Pullman, 82 Wash. 2d 794, 514 P.2d 1059 (1973).
4. - Ill. 2d -, 360 N.E.2d 55 (1977).
5. 32 II. App. 3d 444, 335 N.E.2d 612 (1975).
6. In many respects, the entire area of juvenile law remains under the sway of the
nineteenth century idealism which gave birth to it. Juvenile court judges continually
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In Chambers, two juveniles sitting in an auto parked on a rural
highway at approximately 1:00 a.m. were arrested for violating the
Illinois juvenile curfew law.7 The law made it "unlawful for a person
less than 18 years of age to be present at or upon any public assembly,
building, place, street, or highway" between certain hours of the
night.8 Defendants were convicted in the lower court despite their
claim that the restriction of their freedom of movement deprived them
of liberty without the due process required by the Illinois9 and United
States 10 Constitutions. The appellate court accepted the arguments of
the defendants and reversed the convictions. The Illinois Supreme
Court, however, found that the impact on these constitutional rights
was trivial and that, in light of the increase in juvenile crime, a
statewide juvenile curfew was justified by the state's interest in the
moral and physical well-being of its children."
The curfew has long been regarded as an effective means of com-
munity peace-keeping. 2 Oftentimes, general curfew laws, not con-
recommend "treatment" for delinquents in what are euphemistically called "receiving
homes" or "industrial schools," but which are actually little better than prisons where
the juvenile's world becomes "a building with whitewashed walls, regimented routine,
and institutional hours." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967), citing Holmes's Appeal, 379
Pa. 599, 616, 109 A.2d 523, 530 (1954). See also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,556
(1966). Examples abound in which a juvenile sentenced to a "home" actually degener-
ates in the "care" of the the state due to the deplorable conditions there. See Gesicki v.
Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd without opinion, 406 U.S. 913 (1972).
7. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § I (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976).
8. The law forbids the presence of juveniles under 18 in public "[b]etween 12:01
A.M. and 6 A.M. Sunday." Id. Defendants, aged 15 and 17, were arrested on a Sunday
about an hour after "curfew." The curfew was also enforced "[b]etween 12:01 A.M.
and 6 A.M. Saturday" and "[b]etween 11 P.M. on Sunday to Thursday, inclusive, and 6
A.M. on the following day." Id. Exceptions were made for juveniles accompanied by
legal guardians or other persons over 21 approved by a parent, or for juveniles engaged
in some lawful business. Id. It has been held that the failure to include any exceptions in
a curfew law may render it unconstitutional. People v. Kearse, 58 Misc. 2d 277, 295
N.Y.S.2d 192 (Onondaga County Ct. 1968). The same result may occur if the exceptions
are vague. Shreveport v. Brewer, 225 La. 93, 72 So. 2d 308 (1954). Neither Kearse nor
Shreveport are juvenile curfew cases.
9. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law .... " ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
10. "No state shall. . . deprive any person of. . . liberty. . . without due process
of law .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
11. - Ill. 2d at -, 360 N.E.2d at 57-58.
12. The curfew is said to have originated with William the Conqueror, who utilized
the curfew as a device to prevent potentially "dangerous" assemblies of vanquished
Anglo-Saxons. Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate, 236 Md. 548, 552, 204 A.2d 688, 690
(1964). In the United States, curfews designating the hours slaves were permitted in
public were common in the ante-bellum South. Id. at 552, 204 A.2d at 690-91. See




trated challenges to the validity of juvenile curfew laws. 24 Recently,
however, some courts have departed from this superficial method of
review.25
In In re Doe26 a Honolulu curfew ordinance prohibited minors under
eighteen years old from "loitering about" in public places between 10
p.m. and sunrise.27 The Supreme Court of Hawaii noted "the trend
toward extending full constitutional protection to juveniles" 28 and held
that the curfew law, which would be unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad if applied to adults, was similarly vague and overbroad
when applied to juveniles. 29 In City of Seattle v. Pullman,30 the
Washington Supreme Court went further and found that a law, indis-
tinguishable from the ordinance considered in Doe, violated due proc-
ess not only because of its vagueness but because "it [bore] no real or
substantial relationship to the proclaimed governmental interest-the
protection of minors." 31 In neither case was the court willing to accept
the state's special power over juveniles as a justification for the in-
fringement of important rights.
The appellate court in Chambers held the Illinois juvenile curfew
unconstitutional primarily because, by restricting the freedom of
movement, the law in large measure vitiated the freedom to exercise
other rights protected by the first amendment, particularly "the free-
dom to enter into an invaluable social relationship. ',32 While this right
24. See note 2 supra.
25. The reasons have ranged from lack of authority in the promulgating adminis-
trator, Ex Parte McCarver, 39 Tex. Crim. 448, 46 S.W. 936 (Crim. App. 1898), to undue
restriction of personal freedom, Alves v. Justice Court, 148 Cal. App. 2d 419, 306 P.2d
601 (1957), to the unconstitutional vagueness of laws which use "loitering" as the
standard of enforcement, In re Doe, 54 Haw. 647, 513 P.2d 1385 (1973); City of Seattle v.
Pullman, 82 Wash. 2d 794, 514 P.2d 1059 (1973). Both Doe and Pullman, have departed
significantly from previous cases in many substantive aspects. Most notably, the courts
were not content, as other courts have been, to let their decision rest on a more or less
summary invocation of the state's "special authority" over juveniles. Rather the courts
undertook to examine the law's reasonableness in light of the purpose underlying the
existence of the special authority, namely to protect minors from abuses. In both cases
the actions of the legislatures were found wanting. See notes 26-35 and accompanying
text infra.
26. 54 Haw. 647, 513 P.2d 1385 (1973).
27. HONOLULU. HAWAII, REV. ORDINANCES § 13-3A.1 (1969). Exceptions were made
for juveniles accompanied by parents or legal guardians.
28. 54 Haw. at 649, 513 P.2d at 1388.
29. Id.
30. 82 Wash. 2d 794, 514 P.2d 1059 (1973).
31. 82 Wash. 2d at 800, 514 P.2d at 1063.
32. 32 Ill. App. 3d at 448-49, 335 N.E.2d at 617.
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is not specifically mentioned in the first amendment, it is certainly
synonymous with the freedom of association, which the Supreme
Court has "repeatedly held . . . is protected by the First Amend-
ment" 33 and which "is entitled to no less protection than any other
First Amendment right." 34 The appellate court also held that juveniles
shared this right equally with adults.
35
The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed and dismissed the first amend-
ment claim, stating that "the statute is not aimed at any of the funda-
mental values of speech, association or expression protected by the
first amendment.' '36 But the fact that the legislature did not intend the
law to have such consequences is not determinative. If the statute
seriously infringes on fundamental constitutional rights, the law may
be found invalid regardless of legislative intent. 37 The court also re-
jected "the suggestion" that first amendment rights were impaired by
the curfew. 38 However the court's view of the effect of the statute on
first amendment rights seems overly narrow. Other courts have as-
serted that "[a] curfew. . . doubtless has an incidental effect on first
33. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
34. See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 528 (1960) (Black & Douglas, JJ.,
concurring), citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958). See also United States
Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 542-43 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring);
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). See
generally Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1
(1968).
35. 32 Ill. App. 3d at 449, 335 N.E.2d at 617.
36. - Ill. 2d at -, 360 N.E.2d at 57.
37. In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Supreme Court discussed
the problems of motivation and effect. Plaintiff had alleged that the 1965 amendment to
the Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. § 462(b), was unconstitutional because
the purpose of Congress in enacting it was "to suppress freedom of speech," 391 U.S. at
382-83, relying on Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), and Gomillion
v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). The Court held that plaintiff's position was based on a
misunderstanding of these cases.
These cases stand, not for the proposition that legislative motive is a proper basis
for declaring a statute unconstitutional, but that the inevitable effect of a statute on
its face may render it unconstitutional. . . . In these cases, the purpose of the
legislation was irrelevant, because the inevitable effect-the 'necessary scope and
operation,' McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 59 (1904)-abridged constitu-
tional rights.
391 U.S. at 385. The statute in question was held not to have "such inevitable uncon-
stitutional effect" since destruction of a draft card was not necessarily expressive. Id.
Some courts, however, have already noted the inevitable effect curfews have on first
amendment rights. See notes 39 & 40 infra. Thus, unless the court justifies the infringe-
ment of first amendment rights due to a compelling state interest (see note 15 supra),
legislative motive should be irrelevant.




fined to children, are used to help restore order during riots and other
public emergencies.13 Courts approve general curfews under the theory
that the nature of civil disorders and emergencies requires extraordi-
nary measures. 14 Although courts recognize that curfews seriously
infringe personal liberties 15 and thus require a showing of great necessi-
ty, 16 inevitably they are persuaded by the compelling interest in com-
munity order to approve the curfew. 17 Concerns with personal liberty
are eased since the curfew is imposed only during the period of the
emergency. 8 The emergency curfew imposed in good faith has thus
found acceptance in the courts and is generally treated as a reasonable
exercise of the state's police power.19
Winfield, 27 Tenn. 707 (1848). For a brief history of vagrancy laws, which have often had
the effect of curfews, see Ledwith v. Roberts, [1937] 1 K.B. 232, 271.
13. For municipalities, curfews have become perhaps the most common device for
dealing with riots. Glover v. District of Columbia, 250 A.2d 556, 560 (D.C. App. 1969). A
number of states presently have provisions in their codes granting express authority to
the chief executives or legislative councils of municipalities to impose curfews in times
of emergency. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-311B(l) (1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
870.045(1) (West Supp. 1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:329.6(1) (West 1974); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 40, § 37A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1973); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-17-5 (1972);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-827(3) (Cum. Supp. 1974); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 5890e, Sec. 3
(Vernon Supp. 1976).
14. The law in this area is settled. The curfew is definitely a legitimate alternative
open to executives and legislatures faced with riots or other pressing public emergencies.
Note, Judicial Control of the Riot Curfew, 77 YALE L.J. 1560 (1968). Although the
imposition of curfews during emergencies is not beyond judicial review, in the majority
of cases the courts are reluctant to engage in retrospective condemnation of municipal
discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1281 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 943 (1971); Davis v. Justice Court, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 89 Cal. Rptr. 409
(1970); State v. Boles, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 22, 29, 240 A.2d 920, 925 (1967); Glover v.
District of Columbia, 250 A.2d 556, 560 (D.C. App. 1969); State v. Dobbins, 277 N.C.
484, 496-97, 178 S.E.2d 449, 456 (1971); Ervin v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 194, 201-02, 163
N.W.2d 207, 211 (1968). See also Note, Riot Control: The Constitutional Limits of
Search, Arrest and Fair Trial Procedure, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 85, 113 (1968).
15. See United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1280 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
943 (1971); Ervin v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 194, 200, 163 N.W.2d 207, 210 (1968).
16. See People v. McKelvy, 23 Cal. App. 3d 1027, 1035, 100 Cal. Rptr. 661,665 (1972)
("[O]nly a clear showing of emergent necessity can justify [a curfew's] imposition
.... "); Davis v. Justice Court, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 1010, 89 Cal. Rptr. 409, 414
(1970) ("Mhe right to free movement cannot be interfered with unless extraordinary and
perilous conditions exist.").
17. See, e.g., State v. Boles, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 22,240 A.2d 920 passim (1967); Glover
v. District of Columbia, 250 A.2d 556, 559 (D.C. App. 1969).
18. People v. Chambers, 32 I1. App. 3d 444, 446,335 N.E.2d 612,615 (1975). In fact,
it is perhaps this element of the curfew more than any other which courts continually
identify as a redeeming feature. See Glover v. District of Columbia, 250 A.2d 556, 560-61
(D.C. App. 1969); Ervin v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 194, 201, 163 N.W.2d 207, 211 (1968).
19. See cases in notes 13-14 supra.
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By contrast, the law surrounding juvenile curfews is less settled. 20
However one principle has commanded a judicial consensus. Courts
agree that states have a greater interest in controlling the conduct of
juveniles than the conduct of adults. 21 This interest has been given
explicit recognition by the Supreme Court of the United States22 and is
based upon the doctrine of parens patriae, which decrees that the state
must provide for the welfare of its juveniles in "parent-like" fashion
when necessary. 23 Unfortunately, the question of whether or when a
state needs to function as surrogate parent receives little attention in
most juvenile curfew cases. The presumption of validity of all legisla-
tion coupled with a summary assertion of the "special capacity" of the
state to make laws regarding juveniles has, for the most part, frus-
20. See Note, Curfew Ordinances and the Control of NocturnalJuvenile Crime, supra
note 1, at 98 ("Judicial guidance on the particular constitutional issue involved in curfew
regulation of juveniles is sparse. ... ).
21. "It has been recognized that the activities and conduct of minor children under 18
years may be regulated and restricted to a far greater extent than those of adults." City
of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 7 Ohio App. 2d 212, 215, 220 N.E.2d 126, 128 (1966). See note
23 infra. See also Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa.
1975); People v. Walton, 70 Cal. App. 2d 862, 867, 161 P.2d 498, 501 (1945); Thistlewood
v. Trial Magistrate, 236 Md. 548, 554, 204 A.2d 688, 691-92 (1964). Cf. Smith v. State,
444 S.W.2d 941, 947 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969) ("Classifications based on age are no strangers
to our law. Especially familiar are laws designed for the protection of children, such as
those prohibiting the sale of intoxicants to minors. ... ).
22. "The state's authority over children's activities is broader than over like actions
of adults." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944). See also Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 640-41 (1968). In Prince, plaintiffs were Jehovah's Witnesses and
had challenged the constitutionality of a law forbidding minors under a certain age from
selling magazines in public places. The Court upheld the regulation as a legitimate
exercise of the state's police power in view of the vital interest the state has to protect
against "the crippling effects of child employment." 321 U.S. at 168. The Court noted,
however, that "[it is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the
primary use of the highways." Id. at 169. The court also observed that "[sltreet
preaching, whether oral or by handing out literature, is not the primary use of the
highway, even for adults." Id.
23. Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate, 236 Md. 548, 554, 204 A.2d 688, 692 (1964),
provides the best explanation of the doctrine:
In its inception, jurisdiction over minors belonged to the King as parens patriae to
protect his young subjects. Because of the special powers of the State over minors,
many laws pertaining to them or restricting them only, which would not be effective
as to adults, have been upheld on the ground that the classification was not
unreasonable or illegally discriminatory. ...
This doctrine pervades the juvenile law and may in fact be the foundation of it. The
formation of a special law for juveniles began with the creation of a separate court
system for juveniles, organized in Cook County, Ill. in the late 1800's. Its creation was
primarily a response to the harsh treatment of juveniles who were designated to bejuvenile delinquents and then placed alongside hardened adult criminals. Constitutional
objections to the new court system were obviated because the state was allowed to




amendment rights" 39 and that "freedom of movement is inextricably
involved with the freedoms set forth in the first amendment." 40 To say
that a law which makes it a criminal offense for a teenager and his
friends to sit outside the house on a warm summer night at 11 p.m.
does not curtail freedom of association is untenable.
Recognizing that any statute must bear some reasonable relation to a
legitimate state purpose, the state advanced, and the court accepted,
the proposition that the "traditional right of the State to protect its
children ' 41 justified the restrictions found in the curfew. The court
asserted that if minors were given "an absolutely unlimited right not
only to choose their own associates, but also to decide when and where
they will associate with them," 42 the large body of law enacted for the
protection of minors and posited on the doctrine of parens patriae
would have to be reformed. 43 While it is true that under the doctrine the
state may regulate the activity of juveniles to a greater extent than
would be constitutionally permissible for adults, the mere fact that a
law pertains to juveniles does not signal the abandonment of due
process. There are limits on the state's power to control the actions of
any of its citizens, young or old.M
The policy underlying parens patriae is that the state must have
broad discretion to protect its young citizens from the untoward conse-
quences of decisions they are not ready to make.45 In justifying the
39. United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1280 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943
(1971).
40. Ervin v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 194, 200, 163 N.W.2d 207, 210 (1968). But see
Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
41. - I1. 2d at -, 360 N.E.2d at 57-58.
42. Id.
43. Id. See note 23 supra.
44. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923). In Pierce, the Supreme Court recognized that parents have the right
to provide their children with secular as opposed to public schooling. Thus, an act
requiring all children between the ages of eight and sixteen to be enrolled at public
schools only, unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents "to direct the upbring-
ing and education of children under their control." 268 U.S. at 534-35. In Meyer, a
child's right to receive teaching in a foreign language was protected from state encroach-
ment. 262 U.S. at 399. Cf. Danforth v. Planned Parenthood, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (minor
may get abortion without parental consent).
45. See Danforth v. Planned Parenthood, 428 U.S. 52, 104 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Thus, for example, minors below a certain age may be prohibited from
purchasing intoxicants, working long hours, marrying or making enforceable contracts.
The dangers to the health and welfare of juveniles, if allowed to engage in the above
activities without restriction, is more or less apparent. The same cannot be said about the
decision to move about in public. If the average juvenile is prepared to make this
decision, then the state should not make it for him. The juvenile is allowed to make this
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reasonableness of nighttime restrictions the Supreme Court of Illinois
offered only that "when a child is at home during the late night and
early morning hours, it is protected from physical as well as moral
dangers.' '46 In Danforth v. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri47
the United States Supreme Court limited the extent to which a state
may interfere with the protected rights of juveniles in attempting to
provide for their welfare. 48 The Court held, against a strong dissent by
Mr. Justice Stevens, that a minor may obtain an abortion without
parental consent as a matter of right. 49 Currently in Illinois, a juvenile
may decide to obtain an abortion without her parent's consent but that
same juvenile may not be present on the street after 11 p.m. even with
her parent's permission.50
The court also undertook a somewhat "tedious statistical demon-
stration" tending to show that juvenile crime is on the rise. The court
concluded from this analysis that the General Assembly did not act on
"whim or caprice" but was attempting to cope with a serious prob-
lem.5 1 While it is clear that the action of the legislature in promulgating
the curfew was not arbitrary, it is not clear whether the action taken
was therefore constitutionally permissible. For it is apparent that the
reason the state has traditionally been accorded broad discretion to
regulate juvenile activity is so that the state can provide protection for
its juveniles, not from them. Unless the court is acting on the dubious
assumption that something in the night turns otherwise law-abiding
juveniles into criminals, 52 the court cannot logically claim that the act
decision for three-quarters of the day; neither the state nor the court was able to cite
evidence demonstrating that there is anything about the remaining one-quarter of the day
(the curfew hours) which compels the state to invoke its authority as parens patriae.
Thus a strong argument exists that the state's expanded powers to regulate juveniles
under parens patriae is an improper justification for the curfew and the decision of the
juvenile to move about in public should be respected as would that of an adult. The issue
then would not be whether the person being regulated is a juvenile, but whether the
regulation itself is reasonable. It bears noting that the Supreme Court of Washington,
facing a law similar to the one involved in Chambers, held that a curfew for juveniles
bore no reasonable relation to the objective of safeguarding minors and therefore
exceeded the police power of the state. See City of Seattle v. Pullman, 82 Wash. 2d 794,
514 P.2d 1059 (1973).
46. - Ill.2d at -, 360 N.E.2d at 57.
47. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
48. Id. at 70-75.
49. Id. at 75.
50. The Illinois Juvenile Curfew Law provides that "it is unlawful for a parent, legal
guardian or other person to knowingly permit a person in his custody or control to violate
[the curfew]." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § I(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976).
51. - Ill. 2d at -, 360 N.E.2d at 59.




"protects" juveniles. The "traditional right of the state to protect its
children" then falls away as a justification for the law.
What remains is a law prohibiting a certain class of people from
exercising what are arguably constitutionally protected first amend-
ment rights, which should call into play not only due process but the
equal protection clause. Where "fundamental rights and liberties are
asserted under the equal protection clause, classifications which might
invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully
confined." 53
Yet, courts rarely reach these types of issues when dealing with laws
pertaining to juveniles. If the curfew cases are representative, courts
could impose serious restrictions on any juvenile conduct with a per-
functory reference to "the traditional right of the state to protect its
children." This right is unquestionably an important state interest but,
as with any state interest, it must be balanced against the interest in
vindicating individual liberty which is shared by all of society. Hope-
fully, the decisions in Washington and Hawaii were not aberrations
and other courts confronted with challenges to juvenile curfews will
recognize the limits of the state's power over juveniles.
Richard D. Grossman
juvenile criminality is any more acute during the curfew hours than it is during the
non-curfew hours. Id. at -, 360 N.E.2d at 58.
53. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 680 (1966). The Court also
noted that "[i]n determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have
never been confined to historic notions of equality, any more than we have restricted due
process to a fixed catalogue of what was at a given time deemed to be the limits of
fundamental rights. Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause do change." Id. at 675 (emphasis in the original).
Thus, although courts have historically eschewed equal protection analyses in juvenile
curfew cases, in an era of growing recognition of juvenile rights (see In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967); In re Doe, 54 Haw. 647, 513 P.2d 1385 (1973)), such an approach has not
been foreclosed.
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